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
PROSPECTS FOR REUNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

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PROSPECTS FOR REUNIFICATION  
OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

by

Jin Hak Lee  
Colonel, Korean Air Force

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM  
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel Harold M. Sistrunk

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Prospects for Reunification of North and South Korea

AUTHOR: Jin Hak Lee, Colonel, Korean Air Force

The future plans for resolving the Korean conflict must take into account the interplay of two basic factors; the evolving environment outside Korea, and the ever-shifting capabilities and intentions between two hostile Koreas. Direct talks between the authorities of South and North Korea are necessary and that steps to promote greater understanding and reduce tension are needed to pave the way for reunifying the two Koreas.

### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Jin Hak Lee (B.S. Korean Air Force Academy) has flown F-5 fighters since he was a graduate of the Korean Air Force Academy in 1970. He was trained Red Flag at Nellis AFB in 1979 and served as a Fighter Squadron Commander in 1986-1987. His most recent assignment before leaving Korea was Chief of Force Requirement and Planning in Headquarters. He holds the US Air Force Commendation medal. Colonel Lee is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1989.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that the Korean Peninsula today remains one of the most dangerous spots in the world. Ever since the Korean War ended in 1953, the danger of renewed hostilities between South and North Korea has been a dominant factor in the policies of the two Koreas as well as in the policies of the super powers.

The hardening of the division was a product of the "Cold War" and unending competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The question of national reunification must be viewed from the perspectives of inter-Korean relations and opposite ideological orientation, and the alliance relations which come from these ideologies. Super power patrons have added great complexity to resolving Korean problems.

This research is divided into four parts: (1) division of Korea in historical perspectives; (2) United States and Soviet Union policies and what kind of policies they pursue with regard to the two Koreas; (3) a comparison of South and North Korean reunification policies; and (4) future prospects. (KF)

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## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL PROSPECTS OF KOREA'S DIVISION

At Cairo in 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek agreed to terminate the Japanese rule over Korea and determined that, "in due course, Korea shall become free and independent." On the basis of this Cairo declaration and the subsequent agreement by the major powers, Japan's control over Korea was ended and Korea received its independence in the post-world war period. But the restoration of Korean sovereignty was only provisional.

According to the agreement at Yalta in 1945, the Soviet Union was given the "right to occupy" the area north of the 38th Parallel as a "reward" for entry into the war against Japan. At the same time, the area south of the 38th Parallel was to become the United States' zone of occupation.

After World War II, the Soviet Union was emboldened to expand its Communist empire in the Pacific. Using North Korea as its surrogate, the Soviets encouraged Kim Il-sung (who was trained and educated in the Soviet Union) to launch an all-out invasion against South Korea on 25 June 1950. Without massive military support and direct involvement of the Soviet Union, North Korea could not have conceived of unification through military means.

After cessation of hostilities in 1953, the two Koreas chose opposite roads for their economic recoveries and



nation-building. North Korea is known for its strict adherence to Communist orthodoxy and South Korea for its unsevering anti-Communist posture.

CHAPTER III  
MAJOR POWERS AND KOREA'S REUNIFICATION

US Policy

Initial Involvement

Prior to 1945, the United States' concern with and involvement in Korea was minimal. World War II dramatically changed the nature of US involvement. This was reflected early in the Cairo Declaration of December 1943. The Declaration stated that Korea should be divested from Japan, and in due time, become a free and independent nation. The Declaration marked the first official US involvement in Korea's future. By committing to Korea's independence, the United States became the sponsor and final arbitrator of Korea's political development.

The United States assumed this position with only the minimum of preparation. The decision to divide Korea at the 38th Parallel with Soviet Union occupation of the northern half of the country, was made at a short meeting as a means for resolving conflicting bureaucratic inclinations. Also, the decision to "occupy" Korea was made without even the most rudimentary accompanying plans for future.<sup>(2)</sup> Such lack of preparation reflected not only the minimal official knowledge of Korea, but also the limited appreciation of Korea's strategic position as it related to US security concerns.

Despite this contract, the United States demonstrated a clear awareness of the linkage between competition for influence

in Korea and stability in East Asia. Inklings of this awareness were evident in President Roosevelt's emphases upon "trusteeship" and "joint administration." As Soviet-American relations deteriorated following the end of World War II, this awareness became even stronger. In the first East Asian plan entitled Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1259/16, JCS planners defined US strategic objectives primarily in terms of denial; denying the Soviet Union position from which it could cutoff US sea lines of communication and preventing any power from dominating Korea, China, and Japan. In making such a definition, the JCS evinced an awareness of Korea's strategic value both in terms of the Asian Continent and as part of the larger global political struggle with the Soviet Union. They also demonstrated an appreciation of the implication of growing Soviet control in the north. On this basis, the wartime emphasis upon early troop withdrawal was rescinded, negotiations with the Soviet Union were temporarily suspended, and direct efforts to structure political developments in the south were stepped up. In line with this early strategic thinking, the United States initiated a major program of military and economic assistance. Between 1945 and 1949, the United States provided more than \$500 million in economic aid to Korea.<sup>(3)</sup>

#### Withdrawal and Korean War

The "policy for Korea" was gradually undermined, however, by doubts about Korea's strategic importance. Such

doubts were exacerbated by the rapid demobilization and cutbacks in military spending that followed the end of war.

On April 1948, the National Security Council decided to withdraw all US troops from Korea. In addition, the exclusion of Korea from the US defense "perimeter," made famous in Secretary of State Acheson's National Press Club speech of January 1950, encouraged the Communist's invasion.<sup>(4)</sup> The US response to the North Korean's invasion was less a reflection of the strategic importance of Korea than a manifestation of the perceived need to respond to the Soviet challenge. The significance of US intervention is hard to exaggerate. Not only did it integrate Korea fully into central US strategic concerns and commit the United States fundamentally to the "deterrence" of future conflict in the Korean Peninsula, it also helped generate a widespread "brother-in-arms" sentiment that served as the psychological underpinning for a close bilateral alliance. This alliance was formulated with the signing of a Mutual Defense Treaty in October 1953. In the intervention in the Korean War, the United States committed some 350,000 soldiers, spent at least \$18 billion, and suffered some 157,000 casualties.<sup>(5)</sup>

#### Era of Ambivalence

In the period following the Korean War, the most visible symbol of US involvement in Korea was the pervasive American military presence. Throughout this period, the United States maintained roughly 60,000 troops in two divisions to

deter and/or repel another invasion to South Korea. Moreover, since the senior American Military Commander also serves as the Commander of all United Nations' forces, the United States retained operational control over the Korean Armed Forces. The decade from 1960s and 1970s represented a period of growing ambivalence in US security policy toward Korea, sowing the seeds of doubt regarding the American commitment to South Korea's defense. This ambivalence can be traced in part to change in the international environment. Among the changes with implications for US policy toward Korea were the decline of the "Cold War," the rise of "detente," and the emergence of a more "multi-polar" international system. Particularly significant in this latter regard were the Sino-Soviet split and the emerging Sino-American rapprochement. In 1971, the United States decided on the withdrawal of the Seventh Division from South Korea as the implementation of the "Nixon Doctrine." The United States' withdrawal was beneficial in encouraging the South Korean government to recognize the need for greater self-reliance. United States actions also raised widespread doubts about the reliability of the American commitment. Despite frequent reaffirmation of the US intention not to withdraw any more major units, the South Korean Government lacked full confidence in the United States.

With the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, came a US President pledged to withdraw US ground troops from Korea, to reduce US weapons exports, and to make "human-rights" a

principal US policy concern. These issues impacted directly upon South Korea and raised serious problems for the bilateral relationship. Compounding the problems was the fact that the decision was made without prior consultation with South Korea. Coupled with the Carter administration's emphasis upon "human-rights" and the troop withdrawal policy, these actions introduced serious strains in US-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations.

#### New Bilateral Relations

In the 1980s, Reagan emphasized the checking of Soviet expansion as an Asian Pacific power. Given the continuing buildup of Soviet military capability and the demonstrated willingness of the Soviets to take advantage of available opportunities, the United States has a clear interest in opposing further expansion of Soviet influence. From this basis, Reagan promised to maintain, and perhaps even to augment the strength of US forces in South Korea, and to give US Pacific commitments the same weight as their European alliances. He also promised that the United States would rule out any bilateral discussions with North Korea unless South Korea were a "full participant."<sup>(12)</sup> The United States recognized the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula for its own sake rather than merely in terms of the defense of Japan. In addition, the administration promised to improve substantially US military capabilities and assets in the region. The Reagan administration reaffirmed the nuclear umbrella for South Korea.

In what was perhaps the strongest expression of the US security commitment to South Korea in a dozen years, the United States labeled the security of Korea "pivotal" and pledged the United States to render "prompt and effective assistance to repel aggression against the ROK."

#### Reunification Policy of the United States

The reunification to two Koreas has been a thorn to the United States. It is also a strain to regional stability. Uncontrolled conflict could escalate into a regional conflict because of the Peninsula's geopolitical importance and the two Korea's military alliance relations with super powers in the region. Under a notion of "normalizing" the highly unstable inter-Korean relations. Inherent in the notion of "normalization" is the eventual acceptance of two Koreas.

Seeing the possibility and desirability of neither south-dominated reunification nor north-dominated reunification, and given the precarious power symmetry on the Peninsula and in the region, the United States is basically interested in the preservation of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, while giving lip service to a "free and united Korea."

Henry Kissinger's proposal for a four-power conference was predicated upon the acceptance of "two Koreas" by the four powers as a prelude to the cross-recognition of the two Koreas.

On Korean reunification, the United States believes that direct government-to-government talks between the authorities of South and North Korea are necessary and that

steps to promote greater understanding and reduce tension are needed to pave the way for reunifying the nation. The United States believes that the fundamental decisions on the future of the Korean Peninsula must be taken by the Korean people themselves.<sup>(6)</sup>

The United States is unlikely to countenance any sudden change in the political configuration on the Korean Peninsula.

#### Soviet Union's Policy

Comrade-in-Arms of North. Soon after World War II, the Soviet Union forces marched into the northern half of the Korean Peninsula to establish a satellite state. The Soviet Union sees the Peninsula as an important base for expanding its sphere of power. Since Tsarist Russia, her main interest in the Korean Peninsula is in looking for a warm-water port. The Soviets may also think that the seizure of the Korean Peninsula would be useful for accomplishing its goal of the "Finlandization" of Japan. Further, passage through the Korean Strait is most important to the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

In September 1948, the Soviet Union established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPPK) in the north under Kim Il-sung who served during World War II as a Soviet Army Captain. The Soviet Union built-up the military forces to invade the south, and north launched the forces on June 1950. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the Soviet Union has been increasingly irritated by protracted hostilities between



the two Koreas. Meanwhile, the fierce arms race has made it a most militarized region of the world.

During the 1950s, North Korea tried to steer a neutral course in the face of worsening Sino-Soviet relations. As the conflict worsened, however, North Korea frequently showed that it was incapable of total detachment. In the early 1960s, North Korea gradually revealed its leaning toward Chinese lines in the course of the Communist camp's dispute over such matters as Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, the Sino-Indian border dispute, and Cuban missile crises. In the mid-1960s, there were three important developments in Asia that might have drawn North Korea closer to the Soviet Union. Those are the beginning of American bombing of North Vietnam, the signing of the South Korean-Japanese normalization treaty, and the internal crisis created in China by cultural revolution.

From the 1970s, the Soviet Union departed from the previously fixed position of giving unequivocal support to the north. The Soviet Union has adopted a flexible attitude towards South Korea as evident by the invitation of South Korean sports players, high-ranking government offices, and some political scientists to the conference in Moscow.

When South Korea expressed interest in establishing relations with "nonhostile" Communist states in 1971, the Soviet Union gave signs of being willing to build a bridge of communication with Seoul.

### Gorbachev's Vladivostok Initiatives

In Vladivostok in July 1986, Gorbachev said that there is a possibility not only for relieving the dangerous tension in Korean Peninsula, but also for beginning the solving of national problem of the entire Korean people. He insisted that there are no sensible reasons for evading a serious dialogue which has been proposed by the North Korea. What did he have in mind with this statement specific North Korean proposals?

He also accented the Soviet economic role in Pacific region and economic trouble of Siberia. For improving the Soviet Far East economy, he called for active economic relations with all other Pacific nations with joint enterprises and offered to open Vladivostok to visit by foreigners.

Gorbachev's plan to establish economic relations with the Pacific Rim appears making modest progress. Despite previous serious apprehension and reservation, Soviet Union apparently decided to initiate its involvement with the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). For the first time, formally joint participants with South Korea Gorbachev's desire to expand trade with the Soviet Union's Asia-Pacific neighbors through improved political relations and the settlement of outstanding regional disputes is unlikely to yield significant results in the near term.

The future of Gorbachev's "new thinking" vis-a-vis the Korean issue contains both promises and restraints. Promises are largely through the PECC regional economic integration for

internal Soviet economic development. Restraining elements have much to do with Moscow's relations with Washington in the Pacific in Arms Control and in security relations. At any rate, Gorbachev's new initiatives clearly recognize the growing importance of the Korean Peninsula.

### Soviet Interests

From the foregoing analysis of Soviet Union policy on Korea, it can be surmised that Gorbachev's "open door" policy toward South Korea was not motivated by his genuine intension to create "new policy" on the Peninsula, but by changing strategic requirements.

Since Gorbachev's rise to power, the Soviet Union has intensified its efforts to cultivate ties with North Korea. North Korea is searching for newer and greater amounts of military equipment, and Moscow is meeting some of the North Korean needs with MIG-23 fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

The Soviet Union will keep the military tie with the north and look for the economic relations with the south. One thing to keep in mind, however, is that the Soviet Union since the end of World War II has never permitted its satellite states to become democratic. It may not allow North Korea to join South Korea into another political government except communism, inspite of the "Glasnost" policy of Mikhail Gorbachev.

CHAPTER IV  
SOUTH-NORTH KOREA'S REUNIFICATION POLICY

Arms Race Between Two Koreas

Korean Peninsula's stability depends on the balance that prevails among the major powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula. It also depends on the military deterrence existing between South and North Korea in terms of their defense preparedness. Both sides typically spend a large amount of money on the military and arms race. Some 20 to 25 percent of the GNP is believed to be spent for defense by North Korea; 6 to 7 percent of GNP goes to defense in South Korea. This military spending in both Koreas reflects the changes in defense policy orientation and security posture of the two regions.<sup>(11)</sup> North Korea has continued its policy of military buildup since the early 1960s under the so-called Four-Military Policy lines. North Korea's 800,000-man Army ranks sixth in the world and has completed forward deployment of more than half of their troops within 40-60 kilometers of the DMZ. This reduces the lead time for a surprise attack to less than 12 hours.


South Korea has enhanced its defense capability and preparedness since 1971 by implementing the Five-years Force Modernizing Plan (1971-1976) and the Force Improvement Plan I (1976-1981) and II (1981-1986), while North Korea sought military superiority over the south throughout the 1960s and

1970s, South Korea worked to achieve economic supremacy over the north during same period. Since the 1970s, the south has accelerated its efforts on military buildup, so that the military balance between the two states will be restored in the early 1990s. In view of the South Korea's rapid progress in building its own defense industry, the future military balance between both sides may shift to favor the south, largely owing to the superior performance of the South Korean economy.<sup>(8)</sup>

#### Economic Potential


The wealth of the two Koreas was quite evenly matched until the early 1970s, when the south started to out-distance the north. Throughout the 1970s, however, South Korea's economy started to grow at a much faster rate than North Korea's, so that the GNP ratio for the two Koreas in 1980 was to be almost three to one, and that in 1985 almost five to one in favor of South Korea. The economies of both Koreas underwent major structural changes in the 1970s. Both Koreas advanced from largely agricultural economies in the 1960s to semi-industrial economies in the 1970s. In the south, the share of agriculture declined from 40 percent of the GNP to 20 percent between 1965 and 1976, while industry's share increased from 16 percent to 36 percent. Since the differential pattern and rates of economic growth have far-reaching implication for the future of inter-Korean relations, the probable causes for such development need to be identified.<sup>(9)</sup>

Figure 1. GNP and Increase in GNP



Source: *A Comparative Study of South and North Korean Economics* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1986), pp. 30-31.

Figure 2. Per Capita GNP



Source: Same as Figure 1

Table 2. Major Economic Indicators of South & North Korea (1984)

	Unit	South Korea (A)	North Korea (B)	A/B
GNP	U.S.\$ Billion	81.1	14.6	5.5
Per Capita GNP	U.S.\$	1,999	762	2.6
GNP Growth Rate	%	7.5	3.9	1.9
Government Budget	U.S.\$ Billion	16.8	11.1	1.5
Exports	"	29.2	1.3	22.5
Imports	"	30.6	1.4	21.9
Population	Million Persons	40.6	19.3	2.1

### Political Institutions

The respective leaderships are expected to translate the economic resources and military capabilities into workable political capital and assets. How to manage the "crossover" in power relations between North and South Korea, emanating from a major shift in economic and military power relations, remains one of the most important policy issues.

A Rand Corporation study of the comparative capabilities of South and North Korea measured by their long-term security implications, reveals the following balance sheet:

The South. The principal strengths of the South Korea lie in (1) its abundance and well-trained human resources; (2) its proven economic record; (3) its rising international prestige; and (4) its fear of and defense against a North Korean attack.

The principal weaknesses of the south lie in (1) the unstable state of its political situation in a dynamic social environment; and (2) its dependence upon external factors, both economically and militarily. The 1988 Summer Olympics awarded to Seoul a clear recognition of South Korea's new international prestige and status.

The North. The principal strengths of the north lie in (1) its tight and absolutely controlled political structure; (2) its potent military establishment; and (3) the absolute control by Kim Il-sung of the economic and social structure. The vulnerabilities of the north are (1) its economic weakness

relative to the south; (2) its potential for political instability during succession; (3) its declining international position relative to the south; and (4) the limited support received from its allies, the Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China (PRC).<sup>(10)</sup>

#### Reunification Policy of Two Koreas

South Korea. South Korea considers that unification must be achieved through peaceful means and that such a peaceful unification can come only through a gradual and evolutionary process of mutual accommodations and adjustment. It is also apparent that a durable peace is a precondition for building mutual trust which in turn is a precondition for the ultimate process of peaceful unification.

South Korea's step-by-step approach for the unification is the most realistic of available options in dealing with North Korea at the present function. This policy would permit the government to achieve some concrete objectives in reducing tension with North Korea.<sup>(11)</sup> Under this policy, South Korea can engage in planning its own unification goals and objectives such as a long-range planning of 10 years, an intermediate planning of 5 years, and a short-range planning of one, with clear sets of tasks to be accomplished in each planning stage instead of simply reacting to propagandistic overture from North Korea.

South Korea's proposed approach was four steps: (1) preparatory conference to arrange a south-north summit meeting;



(2) summit meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea; (3) conclusion of a provisional agreement on basic relations between South and North Korea; (4) unification formula put into effect through the formation of the Consultative Conference on National Reunification (CCNR); and (5) establishment of a unified democratic republic through the principle of national self-determination and national reconciliation.

The south deals rationally with some of the current issues such as uniting families, opening of the market, joint ventures, summit talks to reduce antagonism and to adapt the different political systems to both peoples. They think, as both sides resolve one issue after another, it is conceivable that both sides can seriously explore the possibility of forming some kind of a political union.<sup>(12)</sup>

The south supports the recognition of both Koreas by the major powers in the region (USA, USSR, PRC, and Japan), and admission of both Koreas to the United Nations pending peaceful reunification.

North Korea. North Korea's policy offers an extreme contrast. The North Korean communist leaders have never hidden the fact that their primary goal is the "liberation" of the south with unification merely an aspect of that policy. Since the early 1960s, Kim Il-sung has repeatedly enunciated the same themes. By means of mass mobilization and heavy sacrifices for military

expenditures, Kim turned the north into an impregnable bastion so that it can safely serve as the secure rear base for the revolutionary movement. In 1975 he stated that, "if revolution takes place in the south, we as one and same the nation will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people . . . . In this war, we will not only lose the military demarcation line, but will gain the country's unification."<sup>(13)</sup> North Korean spokesmen have frequently ascertained that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence can only apply between separate nations, whereas the south is one nation with an illegitimate colonial regime occupying it.

North Korea's reunification policy in the 1980s is centered around its proposal for founding a Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo (DCRK). The DCRK proposal contains concrete and detailed steps deemed necessary to bring about "the unified states of a confederate type." These include (1) a supreme national confederated assembly comprised of an equal number of representatives from both sides, and (2) a standing committee of the assembly that would guide the existing governments of North and South Korea. Both regional governments would administer all the affairs of the confederated state. They described the formula of "one nation/two autonomous regions" under the DCRK scheme as the most practical solution to Korea's reunification problem.<sup>(14)</sup>

## CHAPTER V

### FUTURE PROSPECTS

What are the prospects of the two Koreas being united politically in the near future? Can they overcome what seems to be irreconcilable differences of their political systems and form a single political entity under a central governmental authority? A working political community, according to Amitai Etzioni, must possess at least three integrating powers. They are the identitive power, utilitarian power, and coercive power.<sup>(12)</sup> The Koreans seem to possess to the right kind of integrating asset to bring about a successful political unification. All Koreans have a common identity in language and custom despite the fact that they have been living under entirely different political systems since 1945.

There is no reason why the two Koreas should not unite and remain united in the future. Indeed, one can raise some serious questions as to why they have not yet become united already. The reason seems to be the inability on both sides to agree on the question of who should have control over the third integrating power. Neither side will give up its control over the military and the police. In addition, neither side is prepared to organize their own political and economic structures to bring about a united Korea. Joint control by both sides over coercive power is inconceivable due to lack of trust and confidence between them.

Under these circumstances, neither side is willing to establish a united Korea that would have the central governmental authority unless it has control over it. The question of who should have control over the legitimate and coercive power required to establish law and order so as to promote the orderly economic and political process of the united Korea has yet to be resolved. It is therefore highly unlikely, if not impossible, for the two Koreas to be politically united, unless one political system can completely over power and impose its political will over the other. Voluntary submission by one side to the other is certainly out of the question. Moreover, the present relationship between the two Koreas is practically either non-existent or antagonistic to the degree that their respective relations with other nation-states are usually much friendlier and more civilized than in their relations with each other.

However, in recent years both sides have been engaged in various negotiations to make political reunification a reality. Some examples are the recent Red Cross talks on the reunion of divided families, the direct exchange of mail, the removal of trade barriers, the formation of a Confederation, the meeting of top leaders. Many of these dialogues were held and will be held in the future purely for domestic consumption and propaganda purposes abroad.<sup>(14)</sup> The goal of reunification is considered the national aspiration by both sides and yet, neither side has a realistic goal which can be achieved in the reasonable future.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

The Korean Peninsula still remains a conflict zone because no peace treaty was signed to terminate the Korean War. Only an Armistices Agreement was signed between the United Nations Command and North Korean Armed Forces Command on July 1953.

As a heavily armed area, divided Korea continues to act not only as the focal point of armed confrontation between the two hostile regimes, but also as a strategic fulcrum among the major powers maintaining active interest in and around the Korean Peninsula.

The future stability of Korean Peninsula will be in the best mutual interest of all the parties concerned. The permanent resolution of the Korean problem is unifying the country without war and conflict.

The reunification of two Koreas will depend on the outcome of the interplay of two dynamic factors; (1) inter-Korean relations, especially recognizing each other and engaging in various negotiations for political reunification; (2) the major power policies toward two Koreas, especially acting the key role of peace keeping force to maintain stability on the Peninsula during south-north dialogues and the guarantee of the unify nations' future.

The two states are likely to remain divided for the foreseeable future, but reunification of two Koreas is not a dream forever.

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